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In this paper we develop a framework to analyze strategic situations where
players may have an incentive to delay the start of negotiations. This is the
hold-out problem. We show that both hold-out and simultaneous agreements
are possible outcomes when players choose when to negotiate.
Preliminary: Please Do Not Cite.
1 Introduction
Suppose a developer wants to buy two adjacent blocks of land that are currently
in the possession of two di¤erent owners. The value of the two blocks of land to
the developer is greater than the sum of the individual values of the blocks for each
owner. Under complete information about individual valuations, the developer could
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2’s Best Response
1’s Best ResponseThe owners would accept the o¤ers, the outcome would be e¢cient and the developer
would get all the surplus.
On the other hand, if the owners were to approach the developer sequentially,
the …nal division of the surplus would depend on who makes the …nal o¤er. This
individual would end up with the entire surplus and the e¢cient allocation would be
implemented but at the expense of costly delay. Given the possible advantage that
arises from being the last to make an o¤er, players may strategically delay the start
of a negotiation. This is the hold-out problem.
It is our contention, however, that both ine¢cient allocations and e¢cient alloca-
tions achieved after costly delay are observed. For example, sometimes a developer
successfully manages to buy all the adjacent blocks of land she needs to build a
shopping mall. On the other hand, development are sometimes built around a prop-
erty that the developer failed to acquire. Along the same lines, it is common to see
mergers that were successful in realizing particular synergies and mergers that were
unsuccessful.
Cramton and Tracy (1992) analyzed a sample of 5,002 labor contract negotiations
in the US from 1970 to 1989 involving bargaining units of 1,000 or more workers.
They found that holdouts occurred in 47 percent of the negotiations — a holdout in
this context is de…ned as the time between the expiration of the previous contract and
either the beginning of a strike or the settlement of a new contract, whichever comes
…rst. Cramton and Tracy develop a private-information model where labor disputes
signal a …rm’s willingness to pay. In contrast, we establish a basic framework under
complete information where individuals might holdout because there is a strategic
advantage in going late to the negotiating table. In addition to the developer game
described above, there are several markets where this type of strategic advantage may
be relevant such as in the purchase of patents, purchase of companies and contractual
bargaining of professionals.
Cramton (1992) also analyzes the role of strategic delay when a buyer and a
2seller are engaged in trading a single object and have private information about
their own preferences. Cramton constructs an equilibrium where delay again is used
strategically to signal private information. Cramton extends the work of Admati and
Perry (1987) who examine a setting with one-sided uncertainty and only two possible
types.
These papers have assumed the same basic extensive form as in Rubinstein (1982),
namely, an alternating o¤er framework. An important question is why should one
assume an alternating o¤er structure in a bargaining game and, more importantly,
how do the results change if we assume a di¤erent game form. Mckelvey and Palfrey
(1997) o¤er a partial answer to this question in the context of a concession game;
in each period, there is a simultaneous move in which each player chooses either to
give in or to hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses
to give in, at which point agreement is reached and the game ends, with a bene…t
accruing to each player, and a privately known cost to the player who gave in. For
any discount factor, they …nd that for asymmetric enough priors over the types of the
players, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which the two players alternate in their
willingness to give in. Thus, an alternating o¤er equilibrium arises endogenously,
even though the underlying game form has a simultaneous move structure.
In this paper we also examine a situation where players may negotiate in turn
– such as in the alternating o¤er framework described in the previous paragraph –
or simultaneously. We consider a simple model under complete information and ask
whether costly delay is possible due to the holdout. In our model players choose a
probability of going to the bargaining table. We show that in addition to costly delay
in the form of a hold out, a simultaneous agreement is also possible. That is, we
develop a framework that is ‡exible enough to accommodate both costly delay and
simultaneous decisions. This framework may be particularly suitable for studying
negotiations between parties where valuations exhibit synergies and in the absence of
the possibility of binding contracts between parties outside of the negotiation table –
3either because it is not legal as in the case of mergers or because of the di¢culty of
enforceability of conditional contracts as in the case of a developer making a payment
to one of the land owners conditional on the …nal acquisition from other land owners.1
2 The Model
There are three players in the model. A developer (player 0) wants to buy two blocks
of land, and realize a value v from owning the entire set. However, each of these two
blocks of land are owned by players 1 and 2 respectively, who value the blocks of land
at wi; i = 1;2. The developer values an individual block of land at vi Ideally, the
developer would like to engage each of these players together, make a take-or-leave-
it o¤er, and realize the value v, less payments to the owners. However, an owner
may …nd it in her interest to avoid going to the bargaining table. Thus, players
i = 1;2 simultaneously choose vectors of probabilities pi = (pi1;pi2), where pit 2 [0;1];
§2
t=1pit = 1 is the probability that player i goes to the bargaining table in period
t = 1;2. There are two bargaining periods, to admit the possibility of an owner being
the last player to go to the bargaining table and sell her block to the developer.
The possible outcomes from player i’s bargaining participation decisions are de-
noted xi = (xi1;xi2) 2 X; where
X = f(1;0);(0;1);(0;0);(1;1)g:
The notation xit = 1 indicates that i must bargain with the developer, and any other
that is present at time t. The notation xit = 0 indicates that i successfully avoids
engaging in bargaining at time t.
We assume that bargaining is e¢cient once players are at the bargaining table.
This is consistent with a variety of extensive form bargaining games, such as Ruben-
stein’s bargaining game, that admit e¢cient bargaining as subgame-perfect equilibria.
1Stole and Zwiebel (1996) also examine a bargaining situation – that between the …rm and its
employees – in the absence of binding contracts. Their bargaining protocol captures the power that
an employee has to leave the …rm before production is complete. In contrast, our model is intended
to capture the ability parties have to avoid bargaining for strategic advantage.
4The payo¤ to player i from bargaining when the outcome is (x1;x2) is si : X2 ¡! R.
Let ¼i denote player i’s expected payo¤. The payo¤ for player i = 1;2 6= j is
¼i = pi1pj1si (1;0;1;0) + pi1(1 ¡ pj1)si(1;0;0;1)
+(1 ¡ pi1)pj1si(0;1;1;0) + (1 ¡ pi1)(1 ¡ pj1)si(0;1;0;1)
We can simplify the notation for payo¤s by noting that with two players, it is
su¢cient to list the presence or absence of player 1 and player 2 at date 1, by the pair
(xi1;xj1). With some abuse of notation, let the si be written as functions of (xi1;xj1)
instead of (xi;xj), and drop the second superscript on the pi1, writing instead pi:
¼i = pipjsi (1;1) + pi (1 ¡ pj)si(1;0)
+(1 ¡ pi)pjsi(0;1) + (1 ¡ pi)(1 ¡ pj)si(0;0)
The payo¤ for player 0 is
¼0 = p1p2s0(1;1) + p1(1 ¡ p2)s0(1;0)
+(1 ¡ p1)p2s1(0;1) + (1 ¡ p1)(1 ¡ p2)s0(0;0)
3 Results
To derive the set of possible equilibria, consider player i’s choice of pi. The derivative
with respect to pi is
@¼i
@pi
= (1 ¡ pj)[si(1;0) ¡ si(0;0)] + pj [si(1;1) ¡ si(0;1)].
De…ne
¢i0 = si(1;0) ¡ si(0;0)
as the gain to player i from immediate bargaining, if player j 6= i chooses to delay
bargaining until t = 2. Similarly, de…ne
¢i1 = si(1;1) ¡ si(0;1)




= (1 ¡ pj)¢i0 + pj¢i1. (1)
Proposition 1 The following table summarizes the equilibria, up to symmetry, that
obtain for di¤erent values of ¢ixj.
¢10 ¢11 ¢20 ¢21 (p1;p2)
+ + + + (1;1)
+ + ¡ + (1;1)
+ ¡ + + (0;1)
¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ (0;0)
¡ ¡ ¡ + (0;0)
¡ ¡ + + (0;1)
¡ ¡ + ¡ (0;1)
¡ + ¡ + (pa
1;pa
2)


















Proof. All but the last two rows follow directly from examination of 1. The
last two rows can be derived directly from the best-response correspondences of each






0 for pj < pj
[0;1] for pj = pj
1 for pj > pj
which admit the equilibria stated – see diagram 1. For the case ¢i0 > 0, ¢i1 < 0,





1 for pj < pj
[0;1] for pj = pj
0 for pj > pj
which admit the equilibria stated – see diagram 2.
Intuition for this proposition can be derived directly from the interpretation of the
¢0s. For example, ¢i0 < 0 means that player i would like to delay, if she knew player
6j delayed bargaining, and ¢i1 > 0, means i would like to delay if player j bargains.
This case has the set of equilibria f(0;0);(1;1);(p1;p2)g, because both parties have a
preference for being at the bargaining table together. If instead ¢i0 > 0 and ¢i1 < 0,
both players have a preference for being at the bargaining table separately. This case
is a neat representation of the hold-out problem, although note that many of the
other cases represented in the table have hold-out.
3.1 Example: Generalized Nash Bargaining
Let ®i denote the i’s share of net surplus when all three parties bargain so that
§i®i = 1: De…ne ¯ij =
®i
®i+®j as the i’s share when i and j only bargain together
i 6= j = 1;2. Suppose that the developer values the block of land owned by player i,
i = 1;2, more than player i himself, namely, vi ¸ wi
This leads to the following state-contingent payo¤s:



































(v2 ¡ w2) ¡ ®2(v ¡ w1 ¡ w2)


















Proposition 2 With generalized Nash bargaining, (i) If vi = wi, i = 1;2 and v >
v1+v2 then there is hold-out by both players (0;0); (ii) If v is su¢ciently large, there
is hold-out by both players (0;0).
Proof. For (i), note that¢i0 = ¡®i(v ¡ v1 ¡ v2) < 0 and ¢j0 = ¡®j (v ¡ v1 ¡ v2) <






(v ¡ vj) < 0, j 6= i This case covers rows 3 and
4 in the table (noting symmetry), so that (0;0) is obtained. For (ii), ¢i0 < 0 for
v > 1
®i+®0 (vi ¡ wi) + w1 + w2 ´ vi¤, and ¢i1 < 0 for v > ¡
®i+®0





®j+®0(vj ¡ wj) ¡ wi
´
´ vi¤¤. For v > maxi(vi¤¤;vi¤) the result obtains.
The intuition of these cases is as follows. Consider (i) vi = wi, i = 1;2 and
v > v1 + v2. When vi = wi, a player makes zero surplus if she is the …rst party to
bargain alone. However, if a player delays, she make a positive surplus regardless of
the presence of the other player at the bargaining table. This case could be considered
a leading case, because it can be interpreted as land being useless for business purposes
on its own (vi = wi) unless both blocks are owned (v > v1 + v2); examples of such
would be if there are small blocks of land, and the developer wishes to build a large
supermarket. For (ii), the intuition is straightforward: both players would like to be
alone at the bargaining table after the other player has settled, so they can reap a
larger fraction of the larger gain v as compared with vi. Thus, hold-out is more of a
problem with a very pro…table development project.
4 Exogenous Renegotiation
In this section we modify the basic model by including an exogenous probability that
the …nal outcome is negotiated. This may re‡ect either some legal right where players
have a cooling-o¤ period – as in the sale of real estate – when they can perhaps change
8their minds or perhaps it is the result of a dispute mediator nominated by the courts
whose decision is binding – as prescribed by the industrial relations legislation in
many countries. Here we assume that the exogenous probability that renegotiation
does not occur is given by a function ¸(p1;p2). Moreover, we assume that in case
the renegotiation will take the form of a Nash bargaining game and that the emerging
outcome is the Nash solution where each player receives an equal share of the surplus,
namely,
v ¡ w1 ¡ w2
3
:
Now we can write player i’s expected pro…ts, i = 1;2, as follows
¼i = ¸(p1;p2)fpipjsi (1;1) + pi (1 ¡ pj)si(1;0)
+(1 ¡ pi)pjsi(0;1) + (1 ¡ pi)(1 ¡ pj)si(0;0)g+
(1 ¡ ¸(p1;p2))
v ¡ w1 ¡ w2
3
:
To determine the equilibrium probabilities of going to the bargaining table, player i
chooses pi to maximize his expected pro…ts yielding:
@¼i
@pi




v ¡ w1 ¡ w2
3
¡ pi¢i0 ¡ pipj¢i1 + pipj¢i0 ¡ pjsi(0;1) ¡ (1 ¡ pj)si(0;0)
¾
Where ¢i0 and ¢i1 are as de…ned in the previous section.
It is not di¢cult to see from 2 that the introduction of exogenous renegotiation is
still consistent with the existence of both hold out and simultaneous agreement. In
the next proposition we establish su¢cient conditions for simultaneous negotiations
to be an equilibrium even under the (exogenous) threat of mandatory renegotiation.
The proof is omitted.
Proposition 3 When the total surplus (v ¡w1 ¡w2) is su¢ciently small, it su¢ces
for ¸(p1;p2) to be nondecreasing in both arguments for an agreement to be reached
simultaneously in equilibrium.
9The intuition is quite straightforward. The fact that the probability of renegoti-
ation ( 1¡¸(p1;p2)) decreases with one’s probability of going to the table reinforces
one’s decision to go to the negotiation table over and above the case with no renegoti-
ation. It does not su¢ce, however, for the probability of renegotiation to be increasing
in one’s probability for holdout to persist as an equilibrium. This probability must
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